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1. Introduction 
Consider the following, simple, modal ontological argument: 
1. It’s possible that God exists.  
2. If it’s possible that God exists, then God exists.  
3. So, God exists.1 
A lot of interesting work in modal logic has been marshalled in defense of line (2). Here’s 
the basic idea. Suppose it’s necessary that if God exists, then God necessarily exists. Then, 
under the assumption that it’s possible that God exists, it follows it’s possible that God 
necessarily exists. But, here’s where the modal logic comes in handy, if it’s possible that 
God necessarily exists, then God necessarily exists; and if God necessarily exists, then God 
just flat out exists. So, from our assumption that it’s possible God exists, it follows that God 
exists. Hence, line (2).  
 What about line (1)? Why should anyone believe it’s possible that God exists? Here’s 
one answer: we should believe it’s possible that God exists because we can conceive that 
God exists. In this paper, I will be exploring the connection between conceivability and 
possibility, and support from conceivability for the argument presented above. Here’s how 
the paper will be structured. In section 2, I will characterize the notion of conceivability by 
                                                        
1 A more complex variant of the modal ontological argument is developed by Hartshorne (1965), Malcolm 
(1960), and Plantinga (1974). The argument is further discussed by Oppy (1995), (2016), and by van 
Inwagen (1977) and (2015).  
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comparing it to perceivability. In section 3, I will consider analyses of conceivability in 
terms of imagination. In section 4, I will consider analyses in terms of conceptual 
coherence. Finally, in section 5, I will look at the prospects of supporting the modal 
ontological argument through conceivability.  
 
2. Conceivability and Perceivability 
Some people take the fact that one conceives a proposition as a premise in a little argument 
for the conclusion that that proposition is possible. Others take the fact that one conceives a 
proposition to constitute prima facie evidence for the possibility of that proposition. In this 
paper, I will be interested in the latter of these approaches. I find it fruitful, on the latter 
approach, to investigate another evidence-constituting mental state. Specifically, I find it 
fruitful to investigate perceivability in order to learn what an adequate theory of 
conceivability (as an evidence-constituting mental state) must look like.  
The claim that something is perceivable may be taken in one of two ways. First, it 
may be taken as the claim that someone, either a particular someone or someone in 
general, is able to perceive it. On this way of taking the claim, our attention should properly 
be focused on subjects (i.e. perceivers) and their mental states of perceiving. We should be 
seeking to characterize and analyze the mental state of perceiving and asking what it is 
about various perceivers that makes them able to grasp objects by way of that mental state. 
Alternatively, it might be taken as the claim that something is apt to be perceived. On this 
way of taking the claim, our attention should properly be focused on the objects of 
perception (which, for simplicity, we will take to be states of affairs). We should be asking 
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what it is about various objects that makes them apt to be grasped by way of that mental 
state.2  
 Focus on the subject side of perception for a moment. Note that perceptions can go 
awry. There’s a difference between perceiving and misperceiving. Presumably a 
misperceiving occurs when someone has nearly everything that it takes to be perceiving, 
but somehow or other gets things wrong. Let’s say that when someone, S, is in a mental 
state as if S were perceiving O being F, then S perceives O being F only if it is actually the 
case that O is F. On the other hand, when S is in a sensory state as if S were perceiving O 
being F, if it’s not actually the case that O is F, then S misperceives O being F.3  
 Focus, now, on the object side of perception. Some states of affairs are apt to be 
perceived and others are not. The state of affairs of three being prime just isn’t apt to be 
perceived. It involves an abstract object rather than a concrete object and it involves a 
feature that cannot be detected via sensory perception. But what about states of affairs that 
do involve concrete things and that do involve features that can be detected by sensory 
perception? Are all of those states of affairs apt to be perceived? Probably not. The state of 
affairs of Wesley (my cat) being orange is apt to be perceived. It’s apt to be perceived partly 
because Wesley is in fact orange. The state of affairs of Wesley being grey, if it exists, is not 
apt to be perceived. That’s because Wesley just isn’t grey. Of course, if Wesley had been 
                                                        
2 A similar distinction appears in Aquinas, clearly stated in Expositio Super Librum Boethii De Trinitate, q. 4, a. 
3, ad 1 (p. 151). The distinction also appears in Scotus, where it is most clearly stated in Lectura II, Dist. 3, 
pars. 1, Q 5-6, n. 180. In Lectura II, Scotus says “. . . the fact that [the singular] is not understood per se by our 
intellect is not due to the singular itself but to the imperfection of our intellect; in the same way the fact that 
the owl does not see the sun is not due to the sun itself, but to the owl.” Thanks to Fabrizio Mondadori for 
translating this passage.  
3 It isn’t obvious to me what the difference is between a misperception and a hallucination. For the remainder 
of this paper, I will be ignoring this distinction.  
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grey, then the state of affairs of Wesley being grey would have been apt to be perceived. But 
that isn’t enough to make it actually apt to be perceived.  
 Now let’s turn to conceivability.  Just as with perceivability, the claim that something 
is conceivable may be taken in one of two ways. First, it may be taken as the claim that 
someone, either a particular someone or someone in general, is able to conceive it. On this 
way of taking the claim, our attention should properly be focused on subjects (i.e. 
conceivers) and their mental states of conceiving. We should be seeking to characterize and 
analyze the mental state of conceiving and asking what it is about various conceivers that 
makes them able to grasp objects by way of that mental state. Alternatively, it might be 
taken as the claim that something is apt to be conceived. On this way of taking the claim, 
our attention should properly be focused on the objects of conceiving (i.e. propositions). We 
should be asking what it is about various objects that makes them apt to be grasped by way 
of that mental state.  
 Focus on the subject side for a moment. Note that conceiving can go awry. There’s a 
difference between conceiving and misconceiving. Presumably a misconceiving occurs 
when someone has nearly everything that it takes to be conceiving, but somehow or other 
gets things wrong. Let’s say that when someone, S, is in a mental state as if S were 
conceiving that O is F then S conceives that O is F only if it’s possible that O is F. On the 
other hand, when S is in a sensory state as if S were conceiving that O is F, if it impossible 
for O to be F, then S misconceives that O is F. But if all of that is true, then someone is able 
to conceive a proposition only if it is possible.  
 Focus, now, on the object side of conceiving. Are all propositions apt to be 
conceived? Probably not. Although some impossible propositions would be apt to be 
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conceived if they were possible, it seems plausible that a proposition is apt to be conceived 
only if it is in fact possible. We again have, then, that a proposition is conceivable only if it is 
possible.  
So, from the subject side of things, we have that someone conceives (rather than 
misconceives) a proposition only if it is possible. And from the object side of things, we 
have that a proposition is apt to be conceived by someone only if it is possible. So, we will 
take this as our first constraint on an adequate account of conceivability.  
 
The Representation Constraint:  
If S conceives that P, then P is possible.4   
 
 Now, let’s briefly return to perceiving. When someone, S, perceives O being F, then S 
is prima facie reasonable in believing that O is F. After all, there is an explanatory 
connection between an actual state of affairs and S’s perceiving; the state of affairs causes 
S’s perceiving. Moreover, this causal connection is underwritten by a law-like pattern 
between actual states of affairs of a particular type and perceivings of a particular type. The 
causal connection which is underwritten by a law-like pattern partly grounds that S is 
prima facie reasonable in believing that O is F when S perceives O being F.   
                                                        
4 Stephan Yablo (1993) considers a similar constraint. But since he assumes that conveivings can be fallible, 
he suggests that the veracity condition for conceiving includes the possibility of what is conceived. So, 
according to Yablo, if I conceive that P, then my conceiving that P is veridical only if P is in fact possible. Most 
of what I say below could be said if the constraint were stated as a veracity condition rather than a necessary 
condition on conceiving itself.  
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Similarly, if conceivability generates reasonable belief in possibility, then when S 
conceives that P, S is prima facie reasonable in believing that P. We’ll take this to be the 
second constraint on an adequate theory of conceivability.  
 
The Epistemic Constraint:  
If S conceives that P, then S is prima facie reasonable in believing that P is possible.5 
 
And, on an adequate theory of conceivability, there should be an explanatory connection 
between the possible truth of a proposition and one’s conceiving that proposition; an 
explanatory connection that partly grounds that S is prima facie reasonable in believing 
that P is possible when S conceives that P. We’ll take this to be the third constraint on an 
adequate theory of conceivability. 
  
The Explanatory Constraint:  
If S conceives that P, then there is an explanatory connection between the fact that P 
is possible and the fact that S conceives that P.  
 
This third constraint is probably the most difficult to accommodate. It is highly implausible 
that facts about what is possible cause facts about what various people conceive. What 
seems more likely is that whatever grounds that P is possible also grounds that S is able to 
conceive that P.  
                                                        
5 One might also hold that if S is in a mental state as if S were conceiving that P, then S is prima facie 
reasonable in believing that P is possible. This would allow one to be reasonable in believing that P is possible 
even when one has misconceived that P.   
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 Let’s keep each of these constraints in mind as we consider two of the most 
plausible and best defended approaches of conceivability. We’ll say that any notion of 
conceivability that satisfies these three constraints is a notion of philosophical 
conceivability.  
 
3. Conceivability as Imaginability 
Some people try to assimilate conceivability and imaginability. Stephen Yablo (1993) for 
example, defends the following account of conceiving:6 
 
The First Imagination Account: 
S conceives that P iff S imagines a world, w, such that S takes w to verify that P.7 
   
So, on this view, if I imagine a world such that I take to it verify that some lions have stripes, 
I thereby conceive that some lions have stripes. I imagine such a world, presumably, by 
“seeing with my mind’s eye” or “hearing with my mind’s ear” or by any other kind of what 
                                                        
6 Others who defend views on which conceiving is a type of imagining include Gregory (2010), Ichikawa and 
Jarvis (2012), and Kung (2010), (2016). Though Ichikawa and Jarvis should perhaps more properly be 
thought of as conceptual coherence theorists. Critics of conceiving as imagining include Roca-Royes (2011), 
Tidman (1994), and van Inwagen (1998).  
7 Three minor comments are in order about Yablo’s thesis. First, it is unclear why it must be a world that is 
imagined rather than just an object. After all, Yablo explicitly says that one need not imagine a whole world in 
order to imagine a world. For example, one could imagine a world in which a lion has stripes simply by 
imagining a lion with stripes. But, then, it isn’t clear why it’s important to imagine the world rather than just 
the lion. Second, whether or not someone takes something to verify a proposition seems to me epistemically 
irrelevant. A religious fanatic might irrationally take geopolitical events to verify that the end is nigh, but that 
doesn’t make the fanatic rational in believing that the end is nigh. And, third, it seems that ‘verify’ is too 
strong of a word. After all, ‘verify’ is a success term. If something verifies that P, then it is in fact the case that 
P. But the presence of a particular object in one’s experience might give one evidence that P without verifying 
that P (and without one taking the presence in experience to verify that P). Similarly, the presence of an 
object in one’s conceiving or imagining might give one evidence that P is true in one’s conceiving without 
verifying that P (and without one taking the presence in the conceiving or imagining to verify that P in the 
conceiving/imagining). 
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we might call “sensory imaginings”. However, Yablo is clear that one need not imagine 
oneself, or anyone else, having an experience in the imagined world. So, I imagine a world 
such that I take it to verify, from the outside so to speak, that some lions have stripes; I 
need not imagine a world in which I or anyone else has an experience of striped lions or of 
anything.  Yablo is also clear that one need not imagine a world in complete detail or in its 
entirety. So, when I imagine a world such that I take it to verify that some lions have 
stripes, I need not imagine the particular numbers of stripes that various lions have. That’s 
just more detail than is necessary. I just need to imagine lions with some number of stripes 
or other. Moreover, I need not imagine either the presence or non-presence of a kangaroo 
in the Woodland Park Zoo. That’s a portion of the world that I can just safely ignore.  
 
3.1 The Imagination Account and the Representation Constraint 
One standard objection to The First Imagination Account is that we can imagine worlds 
that we take to verify propositions that are impossible. For example, we can imagine a 
world in which mathematicians announce that they have discovered and verified a proof of 
Goldbach’s Conjecture. We would take this world to verify that Goldbach’s Conjecture is 
true. Likewise we can imagine a world in which those same mathematicians announcing in 
the same circumstances that they have discovered and verified that there is a 
counterexample to Goldbach’s Conjecture. We would take this world to verify that 
Goldbach’s Conjecture is false. Since Goldbach’s Conjecture is necessarily true if true at all 
and necessarily false if false, we have conceived in one of these situations of something that 
happens to be impossible.  
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 Most straightforwardly, this objection is meant to show that The Imagination 
Account fails to capture philosophical conceivability because it fails to meet The 
Representation Constraint. But since The Representation Constraint is generated from both 
the objective side of conceivability and from the subjective side of conceivability, there are 
actually two problems here.  What this means is that The Imagination Account both fails to 
distinguish between those propositions that are apt to be conceived and those that are not, 
but also fails to distinguish between someone who is conceiving and someone who is 
misconceiving.   
 One thing to note about The First Imagination Account is that the object of 
imagination is a world rather than a possible world. One might think, then, that the 
following simple modification will help to align the account with The Representation 
Constraint: 
 
The Second Imagination Account: 
S conceives that P iff S imagines a possible world, w, such that S takes w to verify 
that P. 
 
But this modification seems to put the view in tension with The Epistemic Constraint. For, 
arguably, one cannot imagine an F without first having enough knowledge of Fs to guide 
one’s imaginative activity; without knowing enough to imagine an F rather than something 
else. For example, one cannot imagine a television news report such that one takes it to 
verify that the end is nigh without first having enough knowledge of televisions news 
reports to guide one’s imaginative activity. If I imagine such a news report, then I must 
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know enough to imagine a television news report verifying that the end is nigh rather than 
a television production of War of the Worlds. It is partly because I already know what a 
television news report looks like that I can imagine one verifying that the end is nigh.  
Similarly, if I imagine a possible world, w, such that I take w to verify that the end is 
nigh, I must first have enough knowledge of possibility to guide my imaginative activity. I 
must know enough to imagine a possible world rather than an impossible world. But if I 
know enough to imagine a possible world such that I take it to verify that the end is nigh, 
then I must already know it’s possible for the end to be nigh. Hence, the imaginative 
experience cannot make me prima facie reasonable in believing it’s possible that the end is 
nigh. Hence, The Second Imagination Account violates The Epistemic Constraint.8 
What we need, clearly, is not a restriction on the object of imagination, but rather a 
separate condition on conceivability. 
 
The Third Imagination Account: 
S conceives that P iff (i) S imagines a world, w, such that S takes w to verify that P 
and (ii) P is possible. 
 
                                                        
8 One might respond to my objection by claiming that imagination is not constrained in the way I am 
suggesting. Perhaps, the responder says, one can imagine one’s television as a toaster or one’s cat as a dog. 
Hence, perhaps one can imagine a possible world as any number of ways without knowing that those ways of 
imagining that world are possible. Unfortunately, if we are so unconstrained, then we can imagine all sorts of 
possible worlds in impossible ways. I can imagine a possible world as a world in which water is composed of 
XYZ rather than H2O. Hence, I can imagine a possible world such that I take it to verify that water is 
composed of XYZ. Of course, I wouldn’t be imagining a possible world as any possible world is, but neither am 
I imagining a cat as any cat is when I imagine a cat as a dog. If imagination is not constrained, then according 
to The Second Imagination Account, I can conceive that water is composed of XYZ. Hence I can conceive of an 
impossibility and The Second Imagination Account is, again, in violation of The Representation Constraint. 
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As I mentioned above, there are two problems for imagination accounts associated with 
The Representation Constraint. One problem has to do with the fact that any adequate 
account of conceiving must distinguish propositions that are apt to be conceived from 
those that are not. The Third Imagination Account avoids this problem by making it explicit 
that a proposition can be conceived only if it is possible. What makes a proposition apt to 
be conceived, then, is that it is possible (or that it has whatever grounds its possibility). But 
the second problem associated with The Representation Constraint is that any adequate 
account of conceiving must distinguish those who are conceiving from those who are 
misconceiving. The Third Imagination Account falls to this second problem.  
 Intuitively, one misconceives that P when one has nearly everything that it takes to 
be conceiving, but somehow or other gets things wrong. But if that’s right, then given The 
Third Imagination Account, one misconceives that P when one imagines that P and yet P is 
impossible. But it seems like we can imagine impossible things without thereby 
misconceiving. For example, when I am watching Game of Thrones, I am imagining a world 
and I take that imaginative world to verify that there are dragons. If, as many contemporary 
philosophers believe, dragons are impossible, then I am imagining an impossibility. But I 
have not thereby misconceived. After all, I am not engaged in any epistemic endeavor at all. 
Hence, I have not done anything epistemically awry and, in particular, I have not 
mistakenly conceived or misconceived. If I have not misconceived when I imagine an 
impossibility, then The Third Imagination Account is mistaken.9    
                                                        
9 Here is a related objection. The conditions under which one has made a mistake in conceiving are very 
different from the conditions under which one has made a mistake in imagining. Mistakes in conceiving are 
grounded in different norms than mistakes in imagining. When I watch the Star Trek episode A Piece of the 
Action, I make a mistake in imagining if I imagine that Captain Kirk and company are gangsters in Chicago 
during the 1920s rather than space explorers from the future. But the imagining is a mistake because one 
ought to imagine that P when viewing a television program that depicts that P. When it comes to conceiving, 
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 Here is a simple modification that will avoid this problem: 
 
The Fourth Imagination Account: 
S conceives that P iff (i) S aims to discover what is possible by way of imagination, 
(ii) S imagines a world, w, such that S takes w to verify that P, and (iii) P is possible. 
 
When one’s aim is to discover what is possible by way of imagination, then (arguably) one 
makes a mistake when one imagines something that is impossible. Hence, The Fourth 
Imagination Account avoids violating The Representation Constraint even when the 
constraint is considered from the subject side. 
 
3.2 The Imagination Account, The Explanatory Constraint, and The Epistemic Constraint 
The Imagination Account must also satisfy The Explanatory Constraint and the Epistemic 
Constraint in order to be a viable account of philosophical conceivability. It doesn’t seem 
like an implausible hypothesis that given any sensory imagining one can have, there is 
something in it that’s possible. Specifically, given any sensory imagining one can have, the 
distribution of sensory qualities that are imagined is possible.10 In this way, one might 
argue, The Imagination Account does in fact satisfy The Explanatory Constraint. After all, 
the necessary connection between sensory imaginings and possible distributions of 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
on the other hand, we are following a different norm: one ought to conceive only what is possible. Hence, a 
mistake in conceiving and a mistake in imagining are violations of different norms and, so, The Third 
Imagination Account is mistaken. 
10 One might object that I can see with my mind’s eye Escher’s waterfall, but that that does not correspond to 
any possible distribution of sensory qualities. However, Shigeo Fukuda is a Japanese artist who has made 
three dimensional models of some of Escher’s drawings, including the waterfall. When viewed from a certain 
angle, one has a visual experience that matches the visual experience one has when looking at Escher’s 
drawing. So, arguably, there is a possible distribution of sensory qualities corresponding to each sensory 
imagining. For a more elaborate defense of this general claim see Sorensen (2006). 
13 
 
sensory qualities might partly ground that one is prima facie reasonable in believing 
something is possible when one is conceiving.  
Let’s suppose that there is something possible in each sensory imagining. Then it 
seems plausible that one who is imagining is thereby prima facie reasonable in believing in 
the possibility of something in that imagining. But what, exactly, is one prima facie 
reasonable in believing?  Some might claim that one is prima facie reasonable in believing 
only in what, in general, is possible in imaginings. Since the distributions of sensory 
qualities are what, in general, is possible in imaginings, it would follow that one is only 
reasonable in believing in the possibility of propositions about those distributions.11 Of 
course, this requires a further modification of The Imagination Account: 
 
The Fifth Imagination Account: 
S conceives that P iff (i) S aims to discover what is possible by way of imagination, 
(ii) S imagines a world, w, such that S takes w to verify P, where (iii) P is about the 
distribution of sensory qualities imagined in w, and (iv) P is possible. 
 
So, on this variant, one can conceive only of propositions about distributions of sensory 
qualities (or propositions that are supported by propositions about such distributions). 
Since those propositions are guaranteed to be possible, given the explanatory connection 
noted above, The Fifth Imagination Account arguably satisfies The Epistemic Constraint.  
                                                        
11 Or, perhaps a bit less narrowly, one might prima facie reasonably believe in the possibility of certain more 
substantive propositions as long as such a proposition is supported by a propositions about the distribution 
of sensory qualities in an imagining. Gregory (2010) and Kung (2010) both defend something like this variant 
of The Imagination Account, though their variants are more sophisticated along a number of dimensions.   
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Recall the example of Goldbach’s Conjecture. I can aim to discover what is possible 
by way of imagination while imagining a world, w, in which mathematicians announce that 
they have discovered and verified a proof of Goldbach’s Conjecture. I can also aim to 
discover what is possible by way of imagination while imagining a world, w, in which 
mathematicians announce that they have discovered and verified the existence of a 
counterexample of Goldbach’s Conjecture. Ordinarily, I might take the first imagined world 
to verify that Goldbach’s Conjecture is true and the second to verify that Goldbach’s 
Conjecture is false. So, on The Fourth Imagination Account, I have nearly all it takes to 
conceive that Goldbach’s Conjecture is true and nearly all it takes to conceive that 
Goldbach’s Conjecture is false. But, given The Fifth Imagination Account, I can conceive by 
way of these imaginings only that it appears as if mathematicians are making certain 
announcements, i.e. that there are distributions of sensory qualities as if there were 
mathematicians making certain announcements.  
The suggestion above has its advantages. But a defender of The Imagination Account 
might resist any further modification. After all, since a necessary condition on conceiving a 
proposition, given The Fourth Imagination Account, is that the proposition in question is 
possible, then even though one can imagine both a world such that one takes it to verify 
Goldbach’s Conjecture and another world such that one takes it to verify the negation of 
Goldbach’s Conjecture, only one of these imaginings can constitute a genuine conceiving.  
Moreover, if one were in fact looking at some mathematicians announcing a proof of 
Goldbach’s Conjecture, then one would thereby be reasonable in believing that Goldbach’s 
Conjecture is true. Similarly, if one were to imagine some mathematicians making such an 
announcement, then one might thereby be reasonable in believing that Goldbach’s 
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Conjecture is possibly true. So, one might think, even The Fourth Imagination Account 
satisfies The Epistemic Constraint.  
However, I think there’s a difference between perceiving Goldbach’s Conjecture 
being true on the one hand and having a perceiving which provides evidence of Goldbach’s 
Conjecture. One cannot plausibly perceive Goldbach’s Conjecture being true since one 
cannot perceive mathematical states of affairs. So, in the case above, one has not perceived 
Goldbach’s Conjecture being true but merely had a perceiving that, in the right 
circumstances, provides evidence in favor of Goldbach’s Conjecture. Moreover, it provides 
evidence merely because of contingent facts connecting perceptions of mathematicians 
making announcements about mathematical results and the truth of those results.  
Similarly, there’s a difference between conceiving that Goldbach’s Conjecture is true 
on the one hand and having a conceiving which, in the right circumstances, provides 
evidence in favor of the possibility of Goldbach’s Conjecture. Arguably, in the case above, no 
one has conceived of Goldbach’s Conjecture being true. Perhaps one has had a conceiving 
that provides evidence for the possibility of Goldbach’s Conjecture. But If it does provide 
evidence, then it does so because of contingent facts connecting one’s conceiving of 
mathematicians making announcements about mathematical results and the possible truth 
of those results. The Fifth Imagination Account can make sense of this distinction and The 
Fourth cannot.12  
                                                        
12 Another reason some might favor The Fifth Account over The Fourth Account is that on The Fifth Account it 
may be transparent to the imaginer that that which is imagined is thereby conceived. For, suppose that I am 
aiming to discover what’s possible by way of imagination while imagining a world in which mathematicians 
announce that they have discovered and verified a proof of Goldbach’s Conjecture. On the Fifth Imagination 
Account, I can thereby conceive only that it appears as if mathematicians are announcing the proof of 
Goldbach’s Conjecture and, as long as I know what it takes to conceive, I can recognize that I am conceiving 
rather than misconceiving. However, if The Fourth Imagination Account were true, then I can be in a mental 
state as if I were conceiving that Goldbach’s Conjecture is true and, if it happens to be possibly true, then I 
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4. Conceivability and Conceptual Consistency 
The explanatory connection between possibility and conceivability on The Fifth 
Imagination Account is very weak. Some might think that the mere necessary connection 
between sensory imaginings and possible distributions of sensory qualities is insufficient 
for generating prima facie reasonable belief in possibilities. The Conceptual Account of 
conceivability might provide a stronger explanatory connection if conceptual consistency is 
a partial grounds for possibility.  
 Here’s an initial idea. Let “Modal Conceptualism” be the thesis that P is necessary iff 
and because P is a conceptual truth.13, 14 Then P is possible iff and because P is consistent 
with all conceptual truths. We may then give the following account: 
 
The Initial Conceptual Account 
S conceives that P iff S knows that P is consistent with all conceptual truths.15  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
would have thereby conceived it. But, in some sense, I won’t be able to recognize that I have conceived rather 
than misconceived. After all, on The Fourth Account, whether I have conceived rather than misconceived has 
everything to do with whether or not Goldbach’s Conjecture is in fact possibly true.  
13 I assume, here and throughout the rest of the essay, that any truth that follows from solely conceptual 
truths is itself a conceptual truth. 
14 Traditional Conventionalism is the conjunction of three theses: (i) For any p, p is necessary iff and because 
p is analytic, (ii) for any p, p is a priori knowable iff and because p is analytic, and (iii) for any p, p is analytic 
iff and because there is a sentence, S, that expresses p and S is true solely in virtue of the conventions of our 
language. See Ayer (1936) for a succinct statement. See Sider (2003) for a detailed critical discussion. The 
view I am considering in the text is slightly different from Traditional Conventionalism. First, although all 
analytic truths are conceptual truths, it is not the case that all conceptual truths are analytic. Second, I take no 
stand on whether or not either analytic truths or conceptual truths are true because of the conventions of our 
language. It is perfectly consistent with the view expressed in the text, for example, that conceptual truths are 
brute facts.  
15 Gendler and Hawthorne (2002) consider an account of conceivability similar to the one above which 
assumes that all necessary truths are a priori knowable. 
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Given Modal Conceptualism and The Initial Conceptual Account, the fact that a proposition 
is consistent with all conceptual truths is a partial grounds for the fact that it is possible 
and for the fact that it is conceivable. Hence, there is a tight explanatory connection 
between conceivability and possibility and The Explanatory Constraint is met. Since 
something is possible because it is consistent with all conceptual truths, if someone knows 
that it is consistent with all conceptual truths, then she is in a position to know that it is 
possible. Hence, the Epistemic Constraint is met. And, finally, since knowledge entails truth, 
if someone knows that a proposition is consistent with all conceptual truths, it is in fact 
consistent with all conceptual truths and hence, given Modal Conceptualism, is possible. So, 
the view satisfies the Representational Constraint.  
 
4.1 Sophisticated Modal Conceptualism 
 Unfortunately, Modal Conceptualism is false. In the latter half of the 20th century, 
metaphysicians became more comfortable with certain necessities that seem to be non-
conceptual. For example, it is often accepted that water is necessarily composed solely of 
the chemical elements hydrogen and oxygen. But, of course, it’s not conceptually true that 
water is composed solely of those chemical elements. Hence, some necessary truths are not 
conceptual truths.16, 17 
                                                        
16 Early discussions of these necessities include Kripke (1971), (1980), and Putnam (1975). They, however, 
were not focused on whether or not these propositions are conceptual truths. Other examples of necessary 
truths that are not conceptual might include the propositions that Sasha Obama’s parents are Barack and 
Michelle Obama, that gold has atomic number 79, and that pain is intrinsically bad.  
17 Putnam (1975) briefly argues that conceivability is not a guide to possibility on the grounds that one might 
conceive of these necessities being false. Putnam, though, seems to be assuming something like the first 
imagination account of conceivability. As we have already seen, plausible imagination accounts are more 
sophisticated. 
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 A variant of Modal Conceptualism can accommodate these necessary truths that are 
non-conceptual. Although it’s not conceptually true that water is composed solely of 
chemical elements hydrogen and oxygen, it might be conceptually true that if water is in 
fact solely composed of certain chemical elements, then water is necessarily solely 
composed of those chemical elements. This conceptual truth, when combined with the non-
conceptual truth that water is in fact solely composed of hydrogen and oxygen, entails that 
water is necessarily solely composed of hydrogen and oxygen. This suggests a variant of 
Modal Conceptualism on which all necessary truths can be traced back to conceptual 
truths. Let “Sophisticated Modal Conceptualism” be the view that if something is a 
necessary truth, then either (i) it is necessary because it is conceptual or (ii) it is a 
necessary truth that follows ampliatively from a conceptual truth in conjunction with some 
non-conceptual truths. So, for example, the proposition that all blue things are extended is 
necessary because it is conceptual. But the proposition that water is necessarily composed 
of hydrogen and oxygen follows ampliatively from a conceptual truth and a non-conceptual 
truth; in particular, it follows from the conceptual truth that if water is in fact solely 
composed of certain chemical elements, then water is necessarily solely composed of those 
chemical elements, along with the proposition that water is in fact composed of hydrogen 
and oxygen. On this view, all necessary truths trace their necessity back to conceptual 
truths in one of these two ways.18  
                                                        
18 This view is very similar to the view advocated by Alan Sidelle (1989). However, again, Sidelle focused on 
analytic truths instead of conceptual truths. Moreover, I take no stand on what grounds conceptual truths if 
anything. In particular, I take no stand on whether conceptual truths are grounded in either linguistic 
conventions, a priori conditions of cognition, or anything else thinker centric. For example, it is consistent 
with the view as I have presented it that for each conceptual truth, it’s a brute fact that it is a conceptual truth.  
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 Now we can distinguish between two types of possibility. Let’s say a proposition is 
conceptually possible iff it is consistent with all conceptual truths. And a proposition is 
metaphysically possible iff it is consistent with all conceptual truths together with those 
truths which, when combined with conceptual truths, ampliatively generate necessities. So, 
since it is consistent with all conceptual truths that water is solely composed of chemical 
elements other than hydrogen and oxygen, it is conceptually possible that water is solely 
composed of chemical elements other than hydrogen and oxygen. But, since it ampliatively 
follows from a conceptual and non-conceptual truth together that water is necessarily 
solely composed of hydrogen and oxygen, it isn’t metaphysically possible for water to be 
composed solely of chemical elements other than hydrogen and oxygen.  
 Is there, one might ask, any connection between conceptual possibility and 
metaphysical possibility? Maybe. But I have to admit we’re about to enter a rather dubious 
philosophical realm. Some people think that every conceptually possible proposition 
characterizes a genuine metaphysical possibility. So, consider the proposition that water is 
solely composed of chemical elements other than hydrogen and oxygen. Although this 
proposition isn’t metaphysically possible, it is conceptually possible and hence might 
characterize a metaphysical possibility even though it doesn’t express a metaphysical 
possibility. It might characterize the possibility in which the liquid that fills our lakes and 
oceans is solely composed of chemical elements other than hydrogen and oxygen. For, 
there’s some sense on which, prior to our investigations into its chemical composition, 
water “could have turned out” to be so composed of elements other than hydrogen and 
oxygen.  
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 Here’s one way to make sense of all of this. Suppose the proposition that water is 
solely composed of chemical elements hydrogen and oxygen is identical to a certain 
descriptive proposition. For the sake of brevity, we’ll say that it is identical to the 
proposition that the actual watery substance is solely composed of chemical elements 
hydrogen and oxygen. But the concept of being actual has two dimensions to it. Consider 
the proposition that if Obama had lost the 2012 election, then we would have actually had a 
Republican president in 2013. That proposition has two dimensions of evaluation. Let’s 
look at this given a nearest-worlds account of counterfactuals. First, the counterfactual 
might be evaluated as true since in the nearest world at which Obama loses the 2012 
election, Romney is elected president and so in that world there is a Republican president 
in 2013. For, along this dimension, that alternative world is taken as actual. However, the 
counterfactual might be evaluated as false since even though there is a nearby world at 
which Obama loses the 2012 election, still in this world Obama won and we do not have a 
Republican president. Along this dimension, our world is taken as actual. Each proposition 
containing the concepts of being actual, then, must be evaluated at a pair of worlds, one of 
which is the world taken as actual and the other of which is the world taken as 
counterfactual.  
Let’s go back to our watery example and let’s suppose our world is taken as actual. 
The water substance in our world happens to be composed of hydrogen and oxygen. 
Moreover, that very substance will be composed of hydrogen and oxygen in any world in 
which it is found. So, the proposition that water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen (i.e. 
the proposition that the actual watery substance is composed of hydrogen and oxygen) is 
necessary. This can be represented in the two dimensional chart below where, let’s just 
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stipulate, the watery substance in W1 is H2O and the watery substance in W2 is H2O, but 
the watery substance in W3 has some other chemical composition, XYZ. In the first row, W1 
is taken as actual and the watery substance in W1 happens to be composed solely of 
Hydrogen and oxygen. So, it doesn’t matter which world we consider as counterfactual in 
that row, since the watery substance in W1 is solely composed of hydrogen and oxygen, it 
will be true in those worlds that any substance that is an actual watery substance is 
composed solely of hydrogen and oxygen.   
* World taken as Counterfactual 
 
World taken as 
actual 
 W1 W2 W3 
W1 T T T 
W2    
W3    
*Partial chart for the proposition that the actual watery substance is composed solely of chemical elements hydrogen and 
oxygen (i.e. water is composed solely of chemical elements hydrogen and oxygen). 
 
Similarly, if W2 were taken as actual, then no matter which world is taken as 
counterfactual, the actual water substance, i.e. the substance that is the watery substance in 
W2, is composed solely of hydrogen and oxygen. However, if W3 is taken as actual, then no 
matter which world is taken as counterfactual, the actual water substance, i.e. the 
substance that is the watery substance in W3, is composed solely of XYZ and not hydrogen 
and oxygen. So, we can complete the chart as follows:  
** World taken as Counterfactual 
 
World taken as 
 W1 W2 W3 
W1 T T T 
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actual W2 T T T 
W3 F F F 
**Complete chart for the proposition that water is composed solely of chemical elements hydrogen and oxygen (i.e. water 
is composed solely of chemical elements hydrogen and oxygen) 
 
But if each counterfactual world is itself taken as actual, then the proposition is contingent 
since there are some worlds such that the substance that is the watery substance in those 
worlds is solely composed of chemical elements other than hydrogen and oxygen. This is 
represented by the truth values along the diagonal: 
*** World taken as Counterfactual 
 
World taken as 
actual 
 W1 W2 W3 
W1 T T T 
W2 T T T 
W3 F F F 
***Complete chart for the proposition that the actual watery substance is composed solely of chemical elements hydrogen 
and oxygen (with diagonal bolded). 
 
This diagonal represents how things could have turned out to be prior to our chemical 
investigations. It represents the space of conceptual possibility. The proposition that water 
is composed solely of hydrogen and oxygen, although necessarily true when our world is 
taken as actual, is only contingently true when each counterfactual world is taken as actual. 
It is metaphysically necessary, but conceptually contingent. Similarly, the proposition that 
water is composed solely of some chemical elements other than hydrogen and oxygen is 
necessarily false when our world is taken as actual, but only contingently false when each 
counterfactual world is taken as actual. It is metaphysically impossible, but conceptually 
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contingent. Here’s the two dimensional chart for the proposition that water is composed of 
some chemical elements other than H2O, namely XYZ: 
# World taken as Counterfactual 
 
World taken as 
actual 
 W1 W2 W3 
W1 F F F 
W2 F F F 
W3 T T T 
# Complete chart for the proposition that the actual watery substance is composed solely of chemical elements other than 
hydrogen and oxygen (i.e. water is composed solely of chemical elements other than hydrogen and oxygen) 
 
Notice that it is conceptually possible that water is composed solely of chemical elements 
other than hydrogen and oxygen. That’s represented by the fact that it is true in at least one 
position on the diagonal. But that conceptual possibility just is a metaphysical possibility 
characterized in a different way. The conceptual possibility of water being composed of 
something other than hydrogen and oxygen just is the metaphysical possibility of the 
watery stuff being composed of something other than hydrogen and oxygen. Although, in 
section 5, we will see some reason to reject this link between conceptual possibility and 
metaphysical possibility, for now let’s just accept the link and see whether it will help us to 
develop a notion of philosophical conceivability.  
 
4.2 Two Conceptual Accounts of Conceivability  
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Corresponding to the two kinds of possibility, there are two kinds of conceivability.19 Let’s 
start with The Secondary Conceptual Account since that account corresponds directly, 
rather than indirectly, with metaphysical possibility: 
 
The Secondary Conceptual Account: 
S secondarily conceives that P iff S knows that P is consistent with all conceptual 
truths together with all truths which, when combined with conceptual truths, 
ampliatively entail necessary truths.  
 
Let’s call a truth which, when combined with conceptual truths, ampliatively entails 
necessary truths an “ampliative truth”. Given Sophisticated Modal Conceptualism and The 
Secondary Conceptual Account, the fact that a proposition is consistent with all conceptual 
and ampliative truths is a partial grounds for the fact that it is possible and for the fact that 
it is secondarily conceivable. Hence, there is a tight explanatory connection between 
secondary conceivability and possibility and The Explanatory Constraint is met. Since 
something is possible because it is consistent with all conceptual and ampliative truths, if 
someone knows that it is consistent with all such truths, then she is in a position to know 
that it is possible. Hence, the Epistemic Constraint is met. And, finally, since knowledge 
entails truth, if someone knows that a proposition is consistent with all conceptual and 
ampliative truths, then it is in fact consistent with all such truths and hence, given 
                                                        
19 The notions of conceivability expressed in this section is a simplified version of the notions developed and 
defended by Chalmers (2002). The names I have given to these accounts and to the corresponding notions of 
conceivability match the names used by Chalmers. Moreover, since Ichikawa and Jarvis (2012) focus 
primarily on conceptual coherence as a constraint on imagination, I tend to consider them defenders of a 
variety of the conceptual account. Finally, Menzies (1998) might also be considered a sort of conceptualist 
more broadly construed. Critics of the conceptual approach include Mizrahi and Morrow (2015), Roca-Royes 
(2011), and Yablo (2002) 
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Sophisticated Modal Conceptualism, is possible. So, the view satisfies The Representational 
Constraint.20  
 The Primary Conceptual Account is less straightforward. It corresponds directly 
with conceptual possibility and indirectly with metaphysical possibility: 
 
The Primary Conceptual Account: 
S primarily conceives that P iff and because S knows that P is consistent with all 
conceptual truths. 
 
Let’s start with The Representational Constraint. Recall that something is conceptually 
possible if it is consistent with all conceptual truths. So, since knowledge is factive, if 
someone primarily conceives that P, then P is conceptually possible.  But, since conceptual 
possibilities just are metaphysical possibilities differently characterized, it follows that P, 
under a slightly different characterization, is metaphysically possible. So, The Primary 
Conceptual Account satisfies The Representational Constraint.21 Moreover, the fact that a 
proposition is conceptually consistent partially grounds that it is conceptually possible. 
But, again, conceptual possibility just is metaphysical possibility differently characterized 
and, so, the fact that a proposition is conceptually consistent also partially grounds that it is 
metaphysically possible, at least under some characterization. But, on the account above, 
conceptual consistency also partially grounds primary conceivability. Hence, there is a tight 
                                                        
20 Moreover, we can say that S secondarily misconceives that P iff S reasonably believes that P is consistent 
with all conceptual truths together with all truths which, when combined with conceptual truths, ampliatively 
entail necessary truths even though P is not consistent with all such truths. 
21 We can say that S primarily misconceives that P iff S reasonably believes that P is consistent with all 
conceptual truths even though P is not consistent with all such truths. 
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explanatory connection between primary conceivability and possibility and The 
Explanatory Constraint is met. Since something is possible, under one characterization, 
partly because it is consistent with all conceptual truths, if someone knows that it is 
consistent with all such truths, then she is in a position to know that it is possible. Hence, 
The Epistemic Constraint is met.  
 
5. Conceivability and The Modal Ontological Argument 
Recall the modal ontological argument from the introduction: 
 
1. It’s possible that God exists.  
2. If it’s possible that God exists, then God exists.  
3. So, God exists. 
 
One might reasonably believe the second premise given certain plausible modal principles 
and the assumption that, necessary, if God exists, then God necessarily exists. One might 
reasonably believe the first premise if one philosophically conceives that God exists, that is 
conceives that God exists in whatever sense, if any, generates reasonable belief in the 
possibility of what’s conceived. Or if one philosophically conceives of something that 
otherwise supports the first premise.  
We have three candidate notions of conceiving, The Fifth Imagination Account and 
The Primary and Secondary Conceptual Accounts, each one of which, arguably, satisfies at 
least the three constraints we have laid out for philosophical conceivability. Setting aside 
whether or not any of these three notions really is philosophical conceiving, can anyone 
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conceive, in any of these four senses, that God exists or conceive of something that 
otherwise supports the first premise? I’m not sure. But I’ll consider each of them in turn 
and see whether or not I can conceive that God exists or conceive of something that 
otherwise supports the first premise.  
  
5.1 Conceiving as Imagining and Premise (1) 
First, according to The Fifth Imagination Account: 
 
S conceives that P iff (i) S aims to discover what is possible by way of imagination, 
(ii) S imagines a world, w, such that S takes w to verify P, where (iii) P is about the 
distribution of sensory qualities imagined in w, and (iv) P is possible. 
 
Certainly, I can aim to discover what is possible by way of imagination while imagining a 
world such that I take it to verify that there is a certain distribution of sensory qualities, a 
distribution as if there were authorities announcing the discovery of God in circumstances 
very similar to the actual circumstances. Since such a distribution of sensory qualities is 
possible, given the fourth imagination account, I would thereby be conceiving of such a 
distribution. And, finally, if The Fifth Imagination Account correctly characterizes 
philosophical conceivability, I would be reasonable in believing in the possibility of that 
distribution of sensory qualities. But how do I get from these facts to the possibility that 
God exists? 
 Here’s one idea. Suppose I reasonably believe in the possibility of a distribution of 
sensory qualities as if there were authorities announcing the discovery of God in a 
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circumstance very similar to the actual circumstance. Since the circumstance is very similar 
to the actual circumstance, then arguably I am reasonable in believing of that possible 
circumstance what I would be reasonable in believing if that possible circumstance had 
been actual. And, since I would be reasonable in believing that various authorities are 
announcing the discovery of God if that possible circumstance had been actual, I would be 
reasonable in believing that it’s possible for authorities to announce the discovery of God. 
Finally, since I would be reasonable in believing that God exists if that possible 
circumstance had been actual, then I am reasonable in believing that possibly, God exists.   
 The problem is that I can also conceive of possible circumstances that similarly 
support, as reasonable, belief in the possibility that God does not exist. Since we are 
assuming that, necessarily, if God exists, then God necessarily exists, one of these beliefs is 
mistaken. Moreover, I can easily recognize that fact. When I recognize that I seem to 
reasonably believe both of two incompatible propositions and I have no reason to favor one 
of those beliefs over the other, then I ought to amend my attitude and instead suspend 
judgment. I am at a standoff with myself and, if The Fifth Imagination Account correctly 
characterizes philosophical conceivability, I see no way to break the standoff.22   
 
5.2 The Conceptual Accounts and Premise (1) 
                                                        
22 Tidman (1994) presents a general problem for conceivability accounts of modal knowledge that he calls 
“the standoff problem”. Tidman claims that anytime one can conceive that P, one can also conceive that P is 
impossible and since one can easily recognize that the possibility of P and the possibility of the impossibility 
of P are incompatible, one cannot gain reasonable belief in the possibility of a proposition by conceiving it. I 
think Tidman is mistaken when he claims that anytime one can conceive that P, one can also conceive that P is 
impossible. Remember that, given The Representation Constraint, a proposition cannot be conceivable unless 
it is genuinely possible. However, I do think that the particular standoff indicated above prevents one from 
supporting the second premise of the modal argument on the basis of imagination. But the standoff above 
occurs because of the gap that must be filled between what is conceived (a proposition about the distribution 
of sensory qualities) and the putative possibility under investigation (God’s existence).  
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Perhaps, though, there’s better support for the first premise if we accept one of the 
conceptual accounts of conceivability. Consider The Secondary Conceptual Account: 
 
S secondarily conceives that P iff and because S knows that P is consistent with all 
conceptual truths together with all truths which, when combined with conceptual 
truths, ampliatively entail necessary truths.  
 
Recall that secondary conceivability entails metaphysical possibility on the assumption that 
Sophisticated Modal Conceptualism is correct. So, can I secondarily conceive that God 
exists? 
Well, let me run though some of the things I think I know (or will assume I know) to 
see whether or not I know that God’s existence is consistent with all conceptual truths 
together with all ampliative truths. First, I’ll assume I know that Sophisticated Modal 
Conceptualism is correct. I’ll also assume I know it neither follows from conceptual truths 
alone that God exists nor that God doesn’t exist, i.e. it’s neither a conceptual truth that God 
exists nor a conceptual truth that God does not exist. But, I also know that either it’s 
necessary that God exists or it’s necessary that God doesn’t exist. So, one of those 
necessities, given Sophisticated Modal Conceptualism, must follow from some conceptual 
truth combined with an ampliative truth.  
To make things simple, I’ll assume it’s a conceptual truth that if God exists, then God 
necessarily exists and, similarly, that it’s a conceptual truth that if God doesn’t exist, then, 
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necessarily, God doesn’t exist.23 So, if God exists, then that is an ampliative truth which, 
when combined with a conceptual truth just noted, entails that God necessarily exists. And 
if God does not exist, then that is an ampliative truth that, when combined with a 
conceptual truth just noted, entails that necessarily God does not exist. But the claim that 
God exists is clearly inconsistent with the claim that God does not exist. So, whether or not 
the proposition that God exists is consistent with all conceptual truths together with all 
ampliative truths depends on whether or not the proposition that God does not exist is an 
ampliative truth, and I know that fact. So, since I (let’s suppose) have no idea whether or 
not God exists prior to considering the ontological argument, I have no idea whether or not 
God’s existence is consistent with all conceptual truths together with all ampliative truths. 
Hence, I cannot secondarily conceive that God exists. Moreover, even if I could come to 
know that God exists and, hence, come to know that God’s existence is consistent with all 
conceptual truths together with all ampliative truths, thereby secondarily conceiving that 
God exists, no such conceiving could unobjectionably be used as partial support for the 
modal ontological argument.   
 So what about the primary conceptual account? 
 
                                                        
23 Things can get very complicated. Presumably if Sophisticated Modal Conceptualism is true, then it is a 
conceptual truth. But it seems like a conceptual truth, also, that if Sophisticated Modal Conceptualism is true, 
then it is necessary that if God exists, then there is some truth, T, such that if T, then God necessarily exists. It 
follows that it is a conceptual truth that it’s necessary that if God exists then there is some truth, T, such that if 
T, then God necessarily exists. But the embedded necessary conditional must either be a conceptual truth 
itself or follow from some conceptual truth together with an ampliative truth. Honestly, I can’t say for certain 
that the latter option isn’t correct, but the former option just seems far more plausible. So, let’s suppose it is a 
conceptual truth that if God exists, then there is some truth, T, such that if T, then God necessarily exists. It 
follows by simple conceptual truths of logic that if God exists, then God necessarily exists. So, it is a conceptual 
truth that if God exists, then God necessarily exists. A similar argument can show that it is a conceptual truth 
that if God doesn’t exist, then it’s necessary that God doesn’t exist.  
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S primarily conceives that P iff and because S knows that P is consistent with all 
conceptual truths. 
 
I am assuming I know that it is neither a conceptual truth that God exists nor a conceptual 
truth that God doesn’t exist. So, I can know that the proposition that God exists is consistent 
with all conceptual truths and, hence, I can primarily conceive that God exists. But 
remember that the route from primary conceivability to metaphysical possibility is not 
straightforward. What I can reasonably believe on the basis of my conceiving is that the 
proposition that God exists is conceptually possible. Given the assumption that conceptual 
possibilities just are metaphysical possibilities characterized in a different way, the 
proposition that God exists is metaphysically possible when differently characterized. 
However, I will argue against that assumption and, hence, block any support for the first 
premise by way of primary conceivability; primary conceivability, if I am right, cannot be 
philosophical conceivability.  
As I noted above, if I know that it is neither a conceptual truth that God exists nor a 
conceptual truth that God doesn’t exist, I can primarily conceive that God exists. But I can 
also, then, primarily conceive that God doesn’t exist. What is it that I am conceiving and 
how, if at all, are such conceivings linked to metaphysical possibility? Well, let’s follow our 
watery example and assume the proposition that God exists just is the descriptive 
proposition that the actual essentially unsurpassable necessary being exists and the 
proposition that God doesn’t exist just is the descriptive proposition that the actual 
essentially unsurpassable necessary being doesn’t exist. Using the apparatus of possible 
worlds and assuming, for reductio, that conceptual possibilities are metaphysical 
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possibilities differently characterized, it follows that there is a world taken as actual at 
which there is an essentially unsurpassable necessary being. But, then, the being which at 
that world is an essentially unsurpassable necessary being must, being a necessary being, 
exist at each other world and must, being an essentially unsurpassable being, be 
unsurpassable at each other world as well. But that means that no matter what world is 
taken as actual, there will be an essentially unsurpassable necessary being there. Things 
seem to be looking good for premise (1)! But, recall, the proposition that the actual 
essentially unsurpassable necessary being doesn’t exist is also conceptually possible. So, 
there must be some world taken as actual at which there is no such being. But it cannot be 
both that no matter what world is taken as actual, there will be an essentially 
unsurpassable necessary being there and there is some world taken as actual at which 
there is no such being. Hence, contrary to our assumption, some conceptual possibilities do 
not characterize metaphysical possibilities.24  
 I see three options available to the defender of primary conceivability as 
philosophical conceivability, none of which will help the defender of the modal ontological 
argument. First, one can say that it is neither primarily conceivable that God exists nor that 
God doesn’t exist. On this option, since it is either necessary that God exists or necessary 
that God doesn’t exist, given Sophisticated Modal Conceptualism, one of those two facts 
must follow from an ampliative truth and, hence, we must fall back on secondary 
conceivability. But we’ve already seen that secondary conceivability doesn’t seem to help 
us support premise (1).   
                                                        
24 This problem did not arise in our watery case because the descriptive content associated with water did 
not contain the concept of necessity or essentiality.  
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 Second, one can say that it is either primarily conceivable that God exists or that God 
doesn’t exist, but that it is not both. If one of those propositions is not primarily 
conceivable, then that proposition is inconsistent with some conceptual truth. And if one of 
those propositions is inconsistent with some conceptual truths, then its negation follows 
from conceptual truths alone and, hence, is itself a conceptual truth. So, either it is a 
conceptual truth that God exists or it is a conceptual truth that God doesn’t exist. So, 
whether or not God exists will have to be determined by conceptual analysis before any 
primary conceiving can occur and, hence, no such conceiving could unobjectionably be 
used as partial support for the modal ontological argument.  
 Finally, one might claim that the concept of being unsurpassable is itself descriptive 
and whereas one thing might be essentially unsurpassable when one possibility is taken as 
actual it is not unsurpassable at all, much less essentially unsurpassable, when another 
world is taken as actual. In that case, although we might be able to conceive of an 
essentially unsurpassable necessary being, we have no reason to believe that, when our 
world is taken as actual, it is an unsurpassable being. In other words, what we conceive 
when we conceive of an essentially unsurpassable necessary being characterizes a 
metaphysical possibility, but not the possibility of an essentially unsurpassable necessary 
being. Hence, our primary conceiving does not support premise (1).25, 26  
 
                                                        
25 Similarly, we might think that what is necessary and what is essential depends on which world is taken as 
actual. In that case, although we might be able to conceive of an essentially unsurpassable necessary being, 
when our world is taken as actual, it is a necessary or essentially unsurpassable being. This option has the 
same problems as the one just discussed. 
26 Thanks to the members of my fall 2015 seminar on conceivability and possibility for many helpful 
discussions and for reading an early draft of this paper. Thanks to Stan Husi and Kris McDaniel for reading 
and commenting on early drafts of this paper. And special thanks to Fabrizio Mandadori who extensively 
discussed these issues with me throughout the 2015/2016 academic year. Fabrizio’s insights on this topic are 
extensive and I am afraid that I cannot do this topic the kind of justice it deserves in a short essay.   
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